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PARTNERSHIP PROFITS SHAR E
FOR SERVICES : AN AGGREGATE
EXEGES IS OF REVENUE
PROCEDURE 93-27
(Part 2)

by John Lee

John Lee is professor of law at the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia . He is grateful to the college for a
summer research grant on the profits sha.re issue.
In this article, Professor Lee charts two alternative methods for implementing an aggregate solution to the problem of partnership profits share for
services. The functional, or judicial, method is to
handle (1) the exchange of partner-capacity services
for a profit share subject to the risk f the venture
with th e Culbertson "common law relation of
partnership," nonrealization event doctrine, im plicitly contemplated by the 1984 legi Jative history
to sec tion 707(a)(2), (2) the classic Diamolld tranSitory partner with a substance-over-form rule or
step-tra nsaction rule, and (3) a sale of the partnershjp inte rest in circumstances that would result in
ordinary income in a sale of a proprietorship by a
proprietress with the P'G. Lake "substitution for ordinary income" doctrine, widely applied in
analogou cases under the 1939 code. Lee believes
that rathe r than just setting forth standards, regulations should implement structured discretionary
jus tice. Therefore, he recommends that the Service
and the Treasury use regulations to legislate a
defiJled "tainted freestanding intangible" approach,
inspired in part by United States v. Stafford and in
part by Wolfsen Land & Cattle, which would treat the

value created by performance of partner-capacity
services (or the promise of future partner-capacity
services) as a built-in gain freestanding intangib le.
The transfer of such an intangible to th partnership
in return for a profits interest subject to the risks of
the venture, says Lee, would fall under section 721 's
nonrecognition umbrell a, as in Stafford. Lee explains
that sales by the service partner of her five-yea r
profits share wou1.d be tainted as follows. The tr,lnSferred intangible would carry ordinary inc me
status in the transferee partnership'S "hands" for
five year under section 724, with mandatory allocations of the built-in tainted gain under section 704{c)
to the service partner.
Lee suggests two alternative tax accounting solutions to a year two sale of a profits share. His Alternative A would be to hold the transaction (receipt of the
profits share) open for two years under the "indeterminable character" variant of the open transaction
doctrine to see whether there will be (1) no sale with
the two-year window and resultant nonrecognition
and sale thereafter likely a t capital gain Oust like a
proprietress), or (2) a sale in year two resulting in
ordinary income because of a transitory parlner. His
Alternative B would be to apply year tv.'o balancing
entry notions based upon a reading of Hillsboro.
(The first part of this article appeared in Tax Notes,
Mar. 28, 1994, at p . 1733.)

III. The N eed for an Aggregate Approach ~" 2
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This article proposes two alternative road s to im plementing an aggregate so lution to th e partnership
for services conundrum. The functi o nal approach,
more itted to judi cial reso luti on, is to h zmdle (a) th e
exc han ge of partner-capacity services for a profit shnre
s ubj ec t to th e ri s k of the venture under th e Clilbertsoll
162Credi t to McKee, supra note 89. For criticism of the entity /capital accounts analysis presented therein or at I ast its
results, see Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R.
4488 (Issues Relating to Pass through Entities before th.e House
Ways & Means Subcomm. on Select Revenu Measures, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1986) (Statement of Ass' t Secretary for Tax
Policy Roger Mentz)); Widener, "Partnership Allocations and
Capital Accounts Analy is," 42 Ohio 51. 1... J. 467,498-504 (1981).
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"common law partner relation," (b) the classic Diamond
tran itory partner with a substance-over-form ruJe or
s tep -transac tion rule, and (c) a sale of the partnershjp
interest in circumstances that would result in ordinary
in co me in a sale of a proprietorship by a proprie tress
with the "substitution for ordinary income" doctrine
of Hart and P.C . Lake.263 In fact, the Service and the
courts (by and large under the 1939 code) have already
hiked along the "common-law concept of the partnership relation" and the "sub titution for orrunary income" trails many times, fortunately leaving blazes
a lon g the way.264 My proposed definitional " tainted
mColllmjssioller v. P.G. l.Jzke, Inc. , 356 U.s. 260 (1958); Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Rev Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51,
considered GCM 38502 (Sept. 18, 1980); Rev. Rul. 76-171, 1976-1
C.B. 18; Rev. Rul. 60-352, 1960-1960-2 C.B. 208 (application of
doctrine as applied in 1939 code precedents to partnership interests to gift of partnership interest to a charity where partnership held installment obligations with built-in ordinary gain).
For analysis of the substitution of ordinary income doctrine by
some in the Service, see GCM 39606 (Feb. 27, 1987) (links
doctrine wilh not "property" for section 1221 rule, collection of
judicial authorities at pp. 28-31; excellent discussion of preArkansas Best Corn Products authorities at pp. 46-52); Priv. let.
RHI. 7903024 (Sept. 26, 1978) (links doctrine with rule in Com
Prod. Co. tl. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955»; GCM 36916 (Nov.
11, 1976) (distingHishes doctrine from assignment of income
doctrine at pp. 8-12); GCM 33793 (Apr. 11(1968) (discussion of
cancelJation of lease origins of doctrine at pp. 4-13); Tech. Adv.
Mem. 8744002 GHne 29, 1987) (collection of judiciaJ authorities
at pp. 4-10). See generally EHStice, supra note 17, and Lyon &
Eustice, id. Lane argued against breaking out ordinary component, all ordinary when th service partner sells too soon.
Lane, supra note 5, at 257-58, 264-65. For assignment of income
within the partnership, see GCM 35709 (Mar. 6(1974).
264Por common law partner relationship, see notes 13-30
supra, and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit catalogued
the pre-1954 code entity-aggregate sale of a partnership interes t authorities out of which grew the notion that the Lnke
substitution for ordinary income doctrine overrode the
separate entity approach, very much like section 751 Hnder
the 1954 and 1986 codes. Sherlock v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d
863, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1961) (portion of partnership interest
attributable to Hndistributed ordinary income taxed as such),
cut. denied, 369 U.S. 802 (1962) . The dissent saw this hybrid
rule as a "sugar-coated version of the now-rejected aggregate
theory." 294 F.2d at 867. Entity-leaning decisions drew a distinction between partnership income a lready earned but not
distributed as in Sherlock and true unrealized receivables
such as billed but not coll ected fees and work-in-progress.
See, e.g., Berry v. Unit ed S tates, 267 F.2d 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1959)
(distinguish d assignment of in come cases); United States v.
Donoho, 275 f,2d 489 (8th Cir. 1960). But authorities in the
opposing camp while adopting an entity approach as to saJes
of partne rship interests in gen eral applied Lnke's substitution
for ordi na ry inco me to unrealized receivables including
work-in-progress. Tunnell v. Unit ed States, 259 F.2d 916, 918
(3rd Cir. 1958); accord, Ullit ed Slntes v. Snow, 223 F.2d 103, 108
(9th Cir.) (accrued ordina ry income), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831
(1955); Fischer v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied , 347 U.S. 1014 (1954); Spieker v. Commissioner, 26 T.e.
91,97-9 (1956) (unco lJected accounts receivable and work-inprogress). I now see that Hale v. Com missioner, I.e. Memo
1965-274, was not a sport, only the last partnership spiritual
descendant of these 1939 code substituti on of ordinary income line of authoriti es (only Hort and P.G. Lake were ci ted
by the Tax Co urt in this context.).
98

free s tanding intang ibl e" approach, m o re s uited to
legislative reguJations, would trea t th e value crea ted
by s uch services (or the prom ise of fu ture pa rtn ' rcapacity services) as a built-in gain intangible. T his
idea was inspired in part by Ullil ed tates v. Stafford 265
and in part by Wolfse n Lalld and Callie v. CO llllllissioner.266 Thus, as in Stafford, a transfer of s uch a n intangible to th e partnership.in re turn fo r a p ro fits int erest s ubject to the risks of the venture would com e und r
sect ion 721'5 nonrecogn ition umbre ll a .
How s hould aJ s by the n w-happy erv ice partn er
of her profits sh are be handled ? Simp l . "Taint" th e
transferred intangible with ordinary income status in
the transferee partnershlp's "hands" for five years
under section 724 with the premises that (1) a
"hypothetical" sale of such value with a zero basis 267
by the service provider at the time of "contribution"
would have yielded ordinary income since the value
arose from the service provider's effor ts and not
market forces, and (2) such potential ordinary income
must be "specially" allocated under pos t-1984 section
704(c) to the service provider upon any partnership sale
of the property benefitted by the services (as ordinary
income for at least five years after creation of th valu
under section 724(c)268). What if, as is mor likel y, th
contributing partner sells her profits share (along with
her capital account credited with the tainted intangible) within five years? Such a sa le would yield ordinary income to the ex tent of the value of the freestanding intangible at the time of contribution due to the
interplay of section 704(c}, 724, and 751(a).269 This
" tainted built-in-gain intangible" s olution works
easiest with past services rendered by a partner to be
(where the potential for conversion of ordinary income
into capital gains probably is the greatest). But the
same approach can be applied to past services rendered

265 727 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1984). 1 r cognize that Stafford
itself is subject to a form-over-substance charge. 1991 L.A. Bar
Report, supra note 5; 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra
note 45. But so is any distinction between partner-capacity
services rendered before or after formation of the partnership.
1991 L.A. Bar Report, slIpra; GCM 37193 Guly 13, 1977); 1991
Chicago Bar Report, supra note 1. Such assHmption HOderlies
the 1984 legislative history as wel\, notes 230-34 supra and
accompanying text; and Rev. Proc. 93-27, therefore, correctly
follows through . Use of the tainted built-in-gain contri buted
intangible is in the end a legal fiction chosen to effect equity
in an Hnanticipated year 2 disposition.
26672 T.e. I, 13 (1979).
261This assmnes that the service provider deducted the
cos ts of crea ting the freestanding intangible in the year
created ; however, capital expenditure or start- up cost treatment may be more appropriate in some cases.
268 After five years if entrepreneur sold, capital gains usually would result an yway under a primary p urpose test. Cf
Tollis v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1993-63.
269Section 751(a) provides that any money or property
received by a transferor partner for all or a part of his interest
in partnership section 751(c) or 751 (d) items is considered as
ordinary income, overriding the entity/capital asset rule of
section 741. Due to sections 704(c) and 724, the entire tainted
intangible would go into the transferor partn r's interest in
partnership "inventory items" deemed so disposed of.
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to the partnership prior to formally becoming a partner
and to future services rendered after becoming a
partner, with a couple of additional steps. First, treat
the service renderer's promise to render services
without compensation other than the profit share as
itseli a "tainted" zero-basis intangible in the hands of
the partnership specially allocated to the service
renderer/partner. Performance of the "promised" services by the partner converts, in a nonrealiza lion even t,
the partnership'S promise/intangible into the intangible created by the performance of such services,
which continues to be held by the partnership with an
exchange basis and taint. The tainted intangible approach is consistent with, and arguably even mandated
by, an aggregate approach because character of gain
turns on the partner's activities.
A. Pre-Formation Services
Under the emerging approach of section 707(a)(2),
the question is twofold: Were the services of the sort
that would be performed by a partner within her
capacity as a partner? If so, was the form of payment
a "distributive share" or a more risk-free payment?
Under this analysis, in most cases, the service provider
would be a partner performing services within the
scope of partner activity and the "payment" would
constitute a section 702 distributive share, followed by
distribution.27o As further discussed below, from an
aggregate policy perspective as well, when the service
provider "materially participates," the partnership
should be treated as an aggregate to yield as close an
approximation to "direct taxation as a proprietress" as
possible.
1. Stafford: Freestanding intangible created by
pre-formation services. The leading decision considering "past services" embodied in intangible
property transferred to a ~artnership for a profits share
is Stafford v. United States. n There, the services partner,
in addition to obtaining favorable financing (all that
the services partner had provided in Diamond), obtained a ground lease from the lender who owned the
property on which a ~tel was to be built adjacent to
its offices, raised equity ~apital from limited partners,

270See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
'Z'Jt727 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1984). GCM 37193 auly 13,1977)
seemingly approved of an analysis with the retroactive allocation to a service partner close to that advocated in text.
In the proposed revenue ruling A performed discovery, promotion, and preliminary contact work prior
to the formation of the partnership. However, he transferred to the partnership all the rights and benefits
attributable to that work. The fact that he performed
the services prior to formation of the partnership might
conceivably raise a question whether his transfer to the
partnership consisted of property rather than services.
As discussed above, however, this question should not
be relevant in determining the application of Code section 707(a). What is relevant for purposes of that section is whether the transfer is in substance a
contribution to the partnership.

ld.
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formed a limited partnership, and served as general
partner. The Eleventh Circuit held in Stafford that the
value created by the promoter, here a letter of intent to
provide financing, constituted property and hence
came within section 721.272 Thus, Stafford seemingly
undercuts the Diamond principle that a profits interest
received for services constitutes a taxable transaction
(when the profits interest can be valued) by creating
an exception for past services.273

Stafford seemingly undercuts the
Diamond principle that a profits
interest received for services
constitutes a taxable transaction by
creating an exception for past
services.

'4

Mnrk TV Pictures, Inc . v. Commissioner2 narrowly
compartmentalized a transfer of services and related
property created by such or similar services (for a capital interest) into a transfer of property encompassed by
section 721 and a taxable transfer of services for an
interest. Judge Gibson, the author of the opinion, had
participated in the three-judge panel that had decided
Campbell in the Eighth Circuit the prior year, but did
not write the opinion there. The opinion in Mark IV
reads Campbell most narrowly:
Under 26 U.S.C. section 721, no income is
recognized when a taxpayer exchanges property for a partnership interest. However, when a
taxpayer exchanges services for a partnership
interest, he must include the fair market value
of that interest in gross income under 26 U.S.C.
section 61(a) (1988). See CampbeIl v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 821 -23 (8th Cir. 1991).
Similarly, when a taxpayer contributes both
property and services to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest, the taxpayer
is entitled to exclude from gross income only
that portion of the interest which was exchanged for property. United States v. Stafford,
727 F.2d 1043, 1055 (11th Cir. 1984).275
This narrow (and I believe incorrect) reading of
Campbell highlights the perils of case law resolution of
this area: conflicting decisions and attendant uncertainty. We need either a landmark decision clearly articulating policies and theories for the area or
administrative rules doing the same or, for the present,
drawing more lines than Revenue Procedure 93-27,
which is a very good first step.
An underlying policy in the context of a profits share
received for services is prevention of a service renderer

mContrast Mark IV, 969 F.2d at 673: (failure to show
"guaranteed payments" covered value of services; the.refore,
transfer of intangible for interest also may have covered in
part services.)
27JSee note 265 supra.
214
969 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1992).
27SMark TV, 969 F.2d at 672.
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from converting service-cre ted value into capital
gainP' Stafford, unlike Diamond, would appear to be
contrary to this pOlicy,271 in that the profits share
r ceiv d tax-free could be sold after the requisite holding period rguably resulting in capital gains. Actually,
the more likely judicial result would be ordinary incom under the "substitution of ordinary" income
doctrine. This doctrine is closeLy related to substance
over fonn, assignment of income, and hence the aggregate approach, as the Service and very late 1939
code cases involving sales of partnership interests,
litigated, how ver, after enactment of the 1954 code
(and section 751) recognized.278 This same underlying
avoidance of distortion of income policy was at work
in Hale v. Commissioner,279 a pre-Diamond services case,
wh re the Tax Court deni.ed capital gains to the sale of
a profits interest on the grounds that it was merely a
future income carve-out, pursuant to P.G. Lake, Inc. v.
Commissioner.Ulo Many practitioner commentators have
called for orcUnary income lock-in when a services
partner ree ives a profits interest as a concomitant to
norueeognltion.U1 A more narrow approach is to treat
the transitory ownership of a oroflts interest as indicat-

n, suprn note 8, at 252-58.
1991 L.A. 13 r Report, supra note 5 ("W a lso note that a
rule providing for the taxability of th capital interest partner
invites voidance by partners who will contribute self-construct d prop rty, often of dubious real economic value, to a
partn hlp In exchange for a partn rship interest. Por exampl, in re I tate partnerships, develop rs frequently contribute overY lued business plans, dr wings, plans and
specifications, and loan commitmen ts."); Stt also 1991 New
York City B r Report, supra note 45 ("Does this [Stafford)
me n th t Mr. Diamond would have been better advised to
agree with hi prospective partner that he would be entitled
to a partnership interest If he were 10 obtain a letter of intent
and contribute it to the partnershlp? It ppears that this may
well b th c , but such a sup rficial distinction does not
seem to warrant such a significanUy different tax result.").
%1ISee notes 263 and 264 supra.
17924 T.C.M. 1497 (1965). TuJtnell v. United Stntes, 259 F.2d
916,918 (3rd Cit. 1958), also applied P.G. Lake under the 1939
code to treat the part of the gain from the sale of a partnership
interest attributable to accounts receiv ble.
2M3S6 US. 260 (1958). Ste gtnera/ly Lyon &: Eustice, supra
note 11.
m"SecUon 121 should be amended to provide that, where
a partnership interest is received principally for services and
tax tion is def ned, a partner's distributive share and his
gain from Ie of his partnership interest s hould be recharacteriz d as ordinary ~come in all ev nts. Section 741 should
be mend d accord ingly." 1991 LA. Bar Report, supra note
5. Othe.r b ck.-up amendments were sugg steel.
Section 721 should be amended to provide a special
anti-abuse rule to tax a service partner on the receipt
of cash or other property in exc s of his net cumulative distributive share of partnership in orne. A partner
then shou ld be nontaxable on his subsequent distributive share of partnership income to the extent that income h s been acceleraled under the immediately
previous sen tence. Conforming amendments should be
made to Section 733 to provide that partner's tax
(Footnote 281 continued in next column.)
276
277
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ing that the services were not rendered by the service
partner in her capacity as a partner. Ul
2. Tainted specially allocated built-in gain intangible. Aserviees-created-intangibl approach to profit
shares for services (Stafford) standing by itself undercuts both Diamond and, ultim t ly, Rev. Proc. 93-27 in
mos t cases. The Deficit R duction Act of 1984 amendments to the partnership provision (coupled with section 707(a)(2» inspire a technical approach that reconciles Stafford with the underlying policy of prevention
of conversion of income, while a t the same time providing a mechanism for taxation of the service partner at
the more appropriate time, namely disposition of the
partnership profits interest or a disposition by the
partnership of the underlying vatu created by the secvic s rartner. Under section 724, nacted by the 1984
act, i property transferred by the services partner
would have yielded ordinary Income if sold by her at
the time of contribution, such value constitutes an "inventory" item as to the tran feror partner,2lI3 and henc
an inventory item to the transfer e partnership for the
five-year period following its contribution. Consequently, a partnership sale of this vaJue (within five
years), as part of a sale of the project or property
benefitted by the services rendered, will result in ordinary gain. Such built-in gain must be specially aliae ted to the transferor partner und r seetion 704(c), due
to the differ nce between its basis in the hands of the
transferor partner carried over in ction 723 to the
partnership and its value at the time of the contribution. Section 724 taints such "lov otory items" as to the
partner hip and partner for only five years. Similarly,
if during this initial five-year period, the service
partner sold her partnership profits interest, section
724 coupled with section 751(a) would equally result
in ordinary income to the service partner. For this concep tual framework to work, the value created by the
service partner should not b added to the basis of, say,
a partnership section 1231 asset, but treated instead as
a fr e-standing asset equivalen t to a ftnancial accounting deferred charge, yielding ordinary income upon
sale. 284

ba is in his partner hip interest should not be
decreased by the recharacterized distribution of ca h,
and it similarly should not be increased by the
recharacterized subsequent di tributlve share of
partnership income.
ld. The New York City 13 r, in ontrast, saw uno abu e In
allowing a e.rvice partner to achieve capital gain in a risk
venture. This is particularly true in th context of a partnership because partners are not required under the normal
parto rship tax rules to allocate risk g in proportiona tely to
capltaJ." 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45.
1111981 ABA Tax Section Report, slIpra note 31.
ltJSectlon 124(c)(I) cro refer to th d finition of inventory item in section 751(d)(2), which includes any property
who e ale would in effect generate ordinary income, literally "property other than an capital asset and other than
property described in section 1231."
U4Cf. Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Oear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform,
and Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1,32-38 (1986).
TAX NOTES, April 4, 1994
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As to the critical premise that a h ypoth tical sale by
a propri tress of such self-crea ted value instead of contrib uti on would h ave yi Ided ordinary income, the
cases unfortunately split. Some jurisdictions allow extensive effort by the taxpayer to still yield capitaJ gain
where only a sing l sa le is in vol ved, a in Com missioner
v. WiJliam s,285 wh r the taxpaye r acquired an uncom p le ted vesse l, but prior to construction contracted to
e ll it after cons truction had been completed. The Fifth
Circuit agreed that the vess I was acquired for sale and
that it was held for ale at the time it was so ld. But,
citing Thomas v. Co mmissioner,286 the co urt pointed out
that such purpose did not necessarily mean that the
prop rty was sold while being held for the sale in the
ordina ry course of trad e o r business. "The purcha se
a nd a le of th vessel was a non-recurring specu lative
venture and th e transactions of its acquisition and di position did not cons titute a trade or business of either
Willi ams or the partnership"287 in which he was a
partner and to which the boat was transferred for ul timate sa le by the partnership. The Fifth Circuit has
r ad WiJliam s as turning on no int ntion to devo te on 's
se lf in th e fu ture to the activ ity.288

I

The narrow reading of Campbell in
Mark IV highlights the perils of case
law resolution of this area: conflicting
decisions and attendant uncertainty.

O ther cas s have held that property acquired for the
purpos of sa le to a spec ifi c party pursuant to a
preexisting arrangement cons titutes property held for
sale in th e ordinary course of a trade or business.289
Th e recen t, co ntrovers ial Third Circuit opinion in
Pleasan t S llmmit Land indicates that where property is
purchased subj ec t to a preexisting contract of sale, its
s ub -eq uent sa le pur ua nt to such contract is not neces-

285

256 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1958).
286254 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1958).
28 7
256 F.2d 11 t 155.
288Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Taxpayer, a corporate execu ti ve, financed and served as genera l contractor for construction of plant, which was to be sold
to such corporation upon completion . Taxpaye r had never
before ca rried o ut uch activities and after getting in trouble
with the first project and having to sell it to a developer to
compl te undoubtedly never again would be so involved .
" [A] single transactio n ordinarily will not constitute a trade
or busin s when th taxpayer enters into the transaction
with no expectation of continuing in the field of end eavor." ).
189See Nie/se /l v. United St(lles, 333 F.2d 615 (6th Ci r. 1964)
(acquisi tion of stock by brokerage house pursuant to a written purchase order by a third party specificall y negated any
possible intent on the behalf of brokerage house to purchase
st ck as its own api\al asset); DeM(lrs v. Unit ed Stll f es, 71-1
U.S.T. . Pa ra. 9288, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-925 (S.D. Ind . 1968)
(taxpayer 's sole purpose in erecting a warehouse was to sell
it pursuant to a contract already made; held any profit realiz d on the contract is comp nsatory and , hence, ordinary
income).
TAX NOTES, April 4, 1994

sarily "in the ordinary course of business."29o O th er
transactions look more to th e overalJ business of the
ta xpayer and the effort involved importing a more or
less product -of-efforts approach. For purposes of this
article, Bush v. Co mmissioner291 is mos t appos ite. 1n
Buslt , d evelopm ent activities alone,292 by a taxpay r
who previously had only rented o ut single- and multifamily housing,293 gave rise to ordinary income upon
the taxpayer's sale to the d eve loper who actually constructed a high -rise apa rtment for sa l to the tenant
The Tax Court in Bush saw its rol e as determining
whether the gain was attributable to (a) bus iness activity by the taxpayer, or (b) investment appreciation
and market fluctuations occurring irres pective of any
conduct by the taxpayer. The Tax Co ur t co ncluded tha t
th e taxpayer 's activities in the development of the
project were suffi cien t in themselves to constitute carrying on a business and the ta xpayer 's efforts were not
merely improvements in an a ttempt to di pose of hold ings advantageously in aJ1 orderly business-like man ner. "When considered in light of all th e facto rs, the
substantiality and value of petitione rs' development
activities in re lation to the origi nal cos t of the inte res ts
involved and their individu a l fa ir ma rket values is
convincing evidence.... The gain did no t res ult from
appreciation over a lon g period of time, nor may the
gain be attributed to short-term market flu ctu a tions.
Rather, the gain is solely attributab le to development
activities of petitioners, th eir agents and their associa tes."294 Finally, look at what the taxpayer so ld :
Two parcels of land, options to purchase adjoining
prope rty, a letter of intent from the University of Tennessee to pUIch ase the property a fter a hjg h-rise apartment had been built thereon an d on adjoin ingJ;roperty,
architectural p la ns, and buildin g p e rmits. 95 Ap a rt
from the parcels of land actually owned by the taxpaye r, the se intangibles are th e paradigm for the
tain ted frees tanding intangi ble asset mode l.

290863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied.
291
36 T.C.M. 340 (1977), afrd, 61 0 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1979).
292These activities giving rise to trade or businesses stat us
consisted of " ob taining a le tter of intent from the University
of Tennessee to purchase the property afl'er a hi gh-dse apartment had been built the reon a nd on adjoining property, obtaining options to purchase the adjo ining property, p urch ase
of a parce l of adjoining prop erty, emp lo yment of a rchj tects,
obta ining building permits, cons uJtati ons and negotiations
with th e par ty that ultim ately purchased the e ntire package
that includ ed these p arcels, who in tUIn was to build the
apartment and sell it to the University, a nd activi ties f taxpayers in aid of thei r purchaser in closing the transaction
with the University of Tennessee." 610 F.2d at 427-28.
291The taxpayer acq uired several parcels of adjacent real
property as rental property and then ap proached the Univers ity of Tennessee with a proposal to construct a 320-unit
apartment house for lease to the university. in the course of
negotiations prior to the commencement of cons truction, it
became clear that the university would purchase the property
rather than lease it.
29'36 T.C.M. at 350.
295Jhe taxpayer a lso was compensated by the purchaser I deve loper for negotiation with th univer ity to
bring it into the deaJ .
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A prime adva ntage f this model is that it req u ires
no impl m e ntin g I g is la tion . Profit hare for service
lies in th ar
of th
taff 1984 nd 1 6-87 "restatements" of partn [ship ta ation prepared by the JCT
staff, and thus, ther i unlikely t be any push for
Congr
t r vi it the ar a. ommen tators now need
to do their j b, if Ihe er ice is to go to the next step.

B. Service for an E i t ing Part nership
Th EI
ntb ircuil in lafford was careful to point
owne rship rights in th let ter of intent to
f r
n tru ti n at favorable terms
p. rtn r and not with the partner-

The Service, al I a I at ne lim , ma y have been recepti e to this di ti nction, observing that a ta payer's performanc of" rvi c
pri r to formation of the
par t nersh i p mi ht c nc i abl rai e a ques ti on
wheth r hi tTnns f r t th partner hip c nsisted of
property rather than ervices."29?
Slafford r Ii d n a
ti n 351 deci i n , Jam es v.
Commis iOll er,29H wher a ta payer providing serv ices
e ntered in to
c nlr c l ~ ilh th capita l providers
whereby th s rvic pr vider
reed 10 secure necesary lega l and architectural work and arrange for a
financing of a rental apartm nl pr j c t n th capita l
s uppli ' r ' la nd . Upon
mp l ti n of Lhe projec t, the
landown rs would trans f r th ir land to a corporation,
whi ch wou ld Ih · n iss u e s toc k bo t h to th la n downer
and to Ih e
rvi
provid r. T he s tock issued to the
se rvic provid e r w as purp rted ly received in exchange f r a I an o mmitm nl f r th e financing of
the proj ec t. T he loan co mmitm e nt ran in favor of the
corporali n be au > th e I nd e rs' regula t ions p e rmitt d comm ilm nts on l t
rporalion and not to
individual . In th c rp r t
ntext, sec tion 351(d)
and pr d c s or provi i n cI a rl y s ta te that "services" d n I c n litlll prop rly f r purposes of
sec ti o n 351, whi hal
r uire iI prope rty tra nsfe r.
How e er, th exp li ci t s tatutor y xclu ion of "service" fr m th t rm "pr p rt " under th 1954 and
19 6 c d es ilppar nll y a hi v d th
ame result as

""727 E2d atl 049.
7
5ce G M 37'193 Ouly 13, I 77), p. ,see also pp 21-2; cf
Tech. Adv. M m . 8047005 Uuly 24, 198D) (p oling of capital
doct rine m ay apply to se rvic es perform d prior to the reservoir of c:lp it;:ti co ming int o bing) .
198
53 T. . 69 (1969).
19
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pre- 1954 case la~ .l99 And the Tax Curt, in Diamolld,
pointed to the pr -1954 c de h i to ry of the predecess r
t
c n n 351, wher ca e law with ut any specific
sta tut ryauthorit had e tabli h d that "services" did
not consti tut "pro erly" for purp
of the predece o r of
ti o n 51.3

In the corporate context section
351(d) and predecessor provisi ons
clearly state that "services do not
constitute properly for purposes of
section 351, which also requires a
property transfer.
II

Under a policy analysis and a close rC<lding of the
leg is lntive hi tory o f b th provision, th e s imil a rity
between sec ti ns 721 a nd 5 '1 in this on text di sc ppear .30 1 The tax p li cy r a on (or no t classifying services as property for cction 351 purposes i - that, otherw i ,th c rvi
pr vider c n conv rt hi erv ic s int
a s to k inl r I in the corpomtion, which Ihen co uld
b sold a l capita l gains rates, due to the entity approach
to sa l s o f stock int re ts in C o r S corporation .302 The
c lIap ibJ
rp ration pr v i ions only infrequ nll y
r tard this c nv r 'io n f the service into capitnl
gains. 3OJ O n the oth r hand , a di scu sed above, secb n 704( ),724, a nd 7 1 pr duc th proper character
and Liming: ordinary inc m t the s n ' ice parLner, but
nly upon a di position by th e partn rship of the altte
crea ted by him or upon n di p ition of the p a rtner hip
inlere t (during Ih fi ve-y ar laint period of e lion
724). Th r f r , nap licy basis, pa I services for the
partnership gen erally should be treated the sa m e as
past service o n Ih
rvice provider's ow n behalf
ITan ferred to th e parh1 r hip .
The model of treating Ih valu cr ated by the service provide r as a fr s tandin intangible, i.e. , property, exchanged for a profit h ar requires modificati n
(1) whe re fu tu re s rvi c s are to b provided, and (2)
perhap where th pJrtn e r hip a lready owned the
development rights as to which the serv ice provider
r nders furth er s rvic . [n the fir ' l cas, modification
is nece sa ry b a u e th e value or inta ngib le to be
created by th e futur
. rvi
is not yet in existence
when the servi es provid r rece ives hi profit s hare.
The olution i ' t tr>a t th servic partner a ontrib-

2901ames, 53 T. . at 67, Ci ting an early edition of Bittl<er &
Eustic .
300
56 T.e. at 545 n. 14 .
10I S ee note 152-88 supra and accompanying lexi. The Ser'
vice in a le tt er ruling, how v r, ha s stated that in Ih conte I
of a transfer of a le:l ehold inte r t for .. parlnersh ip interest
that th e nonre ognilion Ir :llment afford d by sections 351
and 721 is similar, " [allth ugh Ih r as ns originally advanc d for nom cognit ion may have been different." Priv.
LeI. Rul. 8225069 (Mar. 24, 19 2) .
lO2 Lane, _lIpra n te 8.
10 Thre -year wait und r s
ti on 341 (d). Lee & Bader, supra
nole 17, at 177 n . 262 .
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uting to the partnership upon entry his promise to
p rform future services on behalf of the partnership
fo r no comp nsa tion beyond allocations and distributions as to the profits share 304 received in exchange for
the promise. This promi se is itselJ treated as a frees tanding intangible. Such intangible a lso would ha ve
a "ca rfyov r" zero basis unde r ection 723 in the hands
of the partnership. Even more surely than in the case
of the Stafford-lik inta ngible created by se rvices, the
bui lt-in ga in in the promi e (the difference be tween the
fair m rke t vaJue of the se rvice less the zero basis) at
the tim e of contribution will constitute a tainted "invent ry" item30S as t the contributing partner. Any
built-in gain in s uch promi se 306 would b e specially allocable under s ction 704(c) to the service partner and
tainted as to him for fiv years under section 724. Such
an inta n gible i simila r to the section 707 regu lation's
deemed promise by th e p a rtne rs hip in a disguis d sa le
to distribute to the contributing partner cash or property contributed by ano th er property. In most cases, the
"promised " serv ices will h ave bee n rendered prior to
any sa l by the service provider of the profits s hare or
th e a le by the p a rtn er s hip of the property to be
ben fitted. By analogy to th e "conversion of rights"
a uthoriti e , the s rvice partner's later p e rformance of
hi promis by rendition o f the services sho uld not
con titute a rea liza tion event. 307 And by ana logy to, or

1<l4Gev urtz, Business Planlling, 172 (F Ollndation Press
1991)(ci ting Levy v. Leavitt, 257 N.Y. 461,178 N.E. 758 (193J)) .
JOS H proprietress sold her promise to render serv ices, clearly the sa le wou ld cons titute s ubstitution for ordinaxy income
und r the P.G. Lake doctrine.
J06'fhe partner to be u ually has little or no basis and the
fair ma rket va lue of the promise is the discounted present
va lu of ervi ces to be rendered for no charge. Uuilt-in-gain
thus is present.
307Cf. Rev. Rul. 90-7, 1990-1 CB. 153 (exchange of certifi cates in an inves tment trust for proportionate share of stock
ow ned by s uch trust does not result in realization of gain or
loss because hold er is in essentially the same position as
b ,fore); Rev. Rul. 72-265, 1972-1 C B. 222 ("The conclusion
that no ga in o r I S5 is rea li zed upon the conversion of a
corporat debenture in to s tock of the ob ligor corporation was
ini tiall y stated in Article 1563 of th Treasury Regulations 45
(1920 dilion) under the Revenue Act of 1918. This rule
remains applicab le except wher prov isions of the Code
specifica ll y require that gain be recognized." ); Rev. Rul. 72348,1972-2 C 6. 97 (conversions of c nvertibl e bond s to s tock
is pu.rel y a readju stmen t of the obligor's capital structure that
does not r ult in ei ther a d eductible loss or a taxable gain);
Rev. Rul. 57-535, 1957-2 CB. 5]3 (conversion pursuant to its
terms of nonmarketa ble Trea ury note into marketable
Tr asury note d oes not res ult in realization; "a transformation of the bonds purs uant to a right contained therein rather
than a di position thereof occurs and, accordingly, there is
then, for fed eral incorn ta x purposes, no rea l exchange or
oth r los d transa tion resu lting in a rea li za tion of gain or
los. The notes in his hands take his gain or loss basis of the
bonds, for determining gain or loss upon subsequ nt sale of
other disposition of the notes. In substance and effect, he
continued to own the same property, it form being changed
pursuant Lo a right emb died in it when he acquired it. CO nl(Footnote 307 continued in next column.)
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under, sectio n 724(d)(3), the intangib l created by the
services also s hould b e tainted.
The Fifth Circuit in Stafford distinguished a service
partner 's developmental ac tiviti es re u l ting in a
mortgage commi tmen t from a s ituati on where the
partnership already owned the development righ ts.
· owever, the tainted frees tanding inta ngibl model
can be appl ied here a s well. The services performed
s hould b e treated as cr ea ting a freestanding intangible
apart from the dev elopmenta l ri ghts much like in
Waffsen Land alld Cattle, where the Tax Curt treated
the costs of draglining irrigation ditche every 10 years
a creating a frees tanding amortizable apart from the
irrigation ditches the m selves.

C. Clear Reflection of Income
Ideall y, I wou ld prefer to trea t admiss ion o f a services pa.rtner as a common-law e ntry into the partnership outside section 721. Then, I would d e termine if
the partners hip itself hold s the proj ct primar ily for
sale determined at the partnership level, looking of
course at the partner-capac ity ser vices of a ll th e
partners. 30B Less cleanly, "subs titution for ordinary income" a la Hale could be used . The major proble m with
such a standa rds approach is that th COUIts mostly
likely would conflict for some time, even in the same
circuit. Compa.r Campbe/lll w ith Mark IV. Such a ta ndards approach is more su ited to co urts than to an
adminis trative agency, unless the s tandards are implem e nted through m a n y, m a ny rules. I think, th erefore,
a better adminj s tra tive solutio n would follow the lines
of the specially allocated tainted frees tanding intangible approach .

pare GCM 18436, C B. 1.937- 1, 101, which applied the rule that,
wher an owner of a bond exercises th righ t provided in the
bond of having the bond converted into stock of the obli gor
corporation, such transaction does not result in reaUzation of
profi t or loss, the transaction not being closed for purposes
of income taxation until disposition of the s tock_"); Rev. Rul.
72-319, 1972-1 CB. 224 (exchan ge of voting trust certificate
for underlying common s tock constituted transfer of all
rights except vo tin g in exchan ge for a II rights including
votin g free of the trust qua lifi ed unde r section 1036 a an
exch ange of co mm on s tock for common s tock und er an
econom ic s ubstance approach). See Liquid CarbOl1ic Corp. v.
Com 111 ' r, 34 B.T.A. 11 9] (1936). Sti ll a n oth er ana l gy is
modifica tions of contract ri ghts. In Silvers teill v. Ull/t ed States,
419 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. J969), the appell ate co urt h ld
tha t in economic substan ce an exc hange of a right to receive
fix ed annual paym ent for life from a trus t for a right to
receive the sale amount on the sa me terms pajd ins tead by a
museum did nol cons titute a "d isposition" und er section
1001. A similar economic substa nce anal ysis wa s used by
Commi5 ioner v. Olm stead Illc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16, 21-22
(8th Cir. 1962), to hold that cancellati on of a contTilct to
receive comrrUssions in consideration of receiving a specified
monthly annuit y runnin g 15 years did not constitute a sale
or other disposition und r section 1001. "[T]he n w contract
merely provided for a different rate or manner o f payment·
whereby the insurance company could discharge its liabili ty
under the agency contract." Olm stead, at 22.
JOB Lee, "Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: WilJ Snow
Fall?" 27 Tax Law. 381 (1974); accord, Fellows, "Partnership,
Taxation: Confusion in Section 702," 32 Tax L. Rev. 67 (1976).
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D. Nonpartner Capacity Transactions
1. 'Rendition of services in nonpartner capacity.
Prior to the 1984 am e ndments to section 707(a), th e
focu s was on wh e th e r the rendition of services (or
tra n fe rs o f property o r cap ital) wa in a partn e r
ca pacity. The Tax Co urt, in Pratt v. CO lllmiss iol1er,309 he ld
that g neral partners receiving fees equ a l to 5 percent
of partnership gro s receip ts fo r performing ongoing
managerial serv ices f r the partnership w ere receiv ing
neither sec tion 707(a) p ay me nt (because th e m anagement fees w r received for se rv ices performed within
the n rm a l sc pe of the partners' duti es a nd pursuant
to the partnership agreem ent3 lO ) nor ection 707(c) pa yments to a partner (since th e fees were computed as
percentag o f g ros in come a nd he nce mea ured b y
partnership " inc m "and section 707(c) payments a re
determined with ut rega rd to partnership incom e).
Since th e payments came under n eithe r section 707(a)
no r 707(c), th e Ta Court held th a t sec ti ons 704 a nd
702(b) app li ed to th a ll oca ti on and ec ti on 731 applied
to th e accompanying d is tribution . The Fifth Circuit affirm d the Tax Court a tits tr a lm e nt o f th e m a nagement f , i . ., trea tm e nt as a n a ll oca ti on and dis tribu tion, but so lely o n th e "partn er ca pacity" ground as to
th
ctio n 707(a) iss ue, beca u e th secti on 707(c) h o ldin g was n o t appea l d . T h e Fifth C irc uit, in Pratt,
f cu ed o n the "s op
f the partners h ip" :
[t is pe rfectly cI a r that the con tract c reat ing
the partnership, which provided for the p e rcentage paym nts to th e gen ra l partner for th ei r
management efforts w a mad e with them qua
partners. Fur thermore, it is eq u a ll y clea r that the
d uties to be pe rformed were ac tiv itie fo r w hi ch
the partnership wns created in the fi rst place, i.e.,
th management of th s hopping c nters. Bearing
in mind, th at the genera l s ta tutory policy fo r
treating partn rships for ta x purposes cant mpl a t d tha t th e in com f a partnership wo uld
fl ow through to the individual partn e rs, it is not
d iffi cult to envision the purpose of Con gress
w hen it c rea ted an excep tion to this ge n era l rule
to limit th e exc pted activities to those specifically outlin d . In doing so, Congress dete rmined
that in orde r for th partn ership to deal with one

309
64 T.C 20 (1975), afl'd, 550 F.2d 1023 (6 th ir. 1977); see
gwe rnlly Widener, s upra n I 262.
J llYfh Servic disagr
s tha t gr 5S inco me a ll cations can
(easil y) meet the section 707(c) sta nd ard of "de te rmined
without· regard to th e in me f the partnershi p." Rev. Rul.
1-300,1981-2 .B. 143, 144, cons idered in Ge M 38607 (Aug.
29, ] 979) (s tat ut e refers to ne t inco me; watered down in
public ruling). Its posil"ion o n partner-capacity serv ices appears less I ar. See Rev. Ru1. 8]-301, 198]-2 C U. 144, 145
(investment adviser perf rmed s imilar ervices for outsid ers
for a fee and could be r moved by limiteds with 60 d ays
notice, pays own expenses and is not liable to other partners
for los es); GeM 37193 Oul y 13, 1977) (turns on whether
serv ices "contributed" to partnership under c1a s ic debtequity nIl es; not required t be recurring), pp. 8-9; Tech. Adv.
Mem . 864200 Oun 0, 1986), p . 21.
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of its partners as a n "outsid e r" th e tra nsac ti on
dealt with mus t be so mething o uts ide th e scope
o f the partnership If, on th e other hand , the acti vit ies constituting the "transaction" w ere activiti es which the partners hip itself wa engaged
in, compen sa tion for su c h tra nsac ti n mus t b ,
treated merely as a rea rrange m e nt be tw een th
partn e r s of their di s trib uti ve s h a r s in th
partne rs hip incom e. 311
The Service follows Pra tt in holding th at th partners hip agreement is controlling as to th e m eanin g of
"partner capacity" services .312 Such se rvi c s n d not
be recurring or continual. 3 13 If the e rvi ces are 11 0 1
provided in a partn rship capa city, th n ecti n 707(a)
applies calling for separa t entity/ p ayment treatment.
Some in the Servi ce h ave u gges ted th e followin g
a na lys is in determining partner capacity s rvi s:
When dealing wi th a fac t si tua tion s uc h a. that
in Pratt, the first step should b e to consider
whe ther the partner is ac ting o th er th an in his
capacityasapartner.Thiswilld termi newh th r
s ubsection (a) or (c) of schon 707 app li es.
As mentioned previous ly, th e All proposa l for
sec tion 707 con is ted only of what i n w, in s ubta nce, ubsec tion (a ). Under the ALI proposa l, a
fixed sa lary paid to a pa rtne r by a p artnership for
serv ices re nd e red other th an in h is capacity as a
partner would h ave bee n treated under the ent ity
approach. We be li eve th at on gress added ubsec tion (c) to apply the entity app roac h in ce rtain
s itua tions not covered by subsection (a), namely,
when a partner rece iv es a guaranteed payment in
his capacity as a partn e r. Thus, in order to de termille whether to apply s ubsection (a) or (c), it i
first necessa ry to an a lyze wheth r a partner ac t d
in his capacity as a p a rtn er und er subse li on (a).
We realize that it will no t alway be ea y to
decid whether services a r e rend r ed in a
pa rtner' capacity as a partner. The app roac h of
yo ur proposed ruljng i to loo k a t a ll f the urro unding facts to determ in e wheth r th pa rtner,
in substance, is acting other than in the capaci ty
of a partne r. On th fac ts pr sent d in th rulin g,
we think it clear that the inv stm e nt adv i or i
not acting as a partne r. Were it n t for th inve tment advisor's s mall int ere s t in pr fit a nd
losses, it would not be a partner a t a ll but mer Iy
a third-party dealing with the pa rtne r hip . W
think it equally clea r that the ta xpayers in Pra ll
were acting as p a rt·ne rs a nd no t a third -partie.
Unfort un ately, however, w e can point to no one
fact in either ca e th a t di ct;! te th e r e ult reach ed.
We previou ly c ns id e red thi s pr b le m in
GCM 37193, w, 1-430-75 Oul y 13, 1977), a nd a l-

311Prnlt ,

550 F.2d at 1026.

12See GeM 37193 (Aug . 29, 1979). Accord, Tech. Adv. Mem.

8539003 (June 13, 1985) (partnership agree men t controls).
313See Ge M 37193, SlIprn.
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thou gh we arrived a t no precise rule for disting uishing between s ubsections (a) and (c), we sugges ted as a n analysis that the test is whe ther the
servi ces in question are being contributed to the
partnershjp. U they are, ubsection (c) will control.
On the other hand, if the p artner is not contributing
services but is acting as any other third-party, subsection (a) will c ntrol. As we recognized in GCM
37193, this app roach g ives the partners substantial
freedom in deciding which section will control. The
purpose underlying section 707, howe ver, was to
es tab li s h th a t partners could deal with th e ir
partnerships as third p arties, and presumably
partners have alw ays had the freedom to decide
what capital or serv ices should be donated to their
partnerships. Thus, we are not overly concerned
with th e fa ct th a t par tne rs are afforded som e
free dom to d ec id e the way in which they will deal
with th eir partnerships.314
Fu rthermore,
IiJn determining whether a transfe r of mon ey
or property to a partn ers hip con s titutes a contributio n, as distinguished from a sa le, exc ha nge,
loan o r rental tra nsac tion, th e sa me crite ria used
in connection with corpora te debt-equity questions are to be a pplied .... The regulations s ta te
that if a transfer of property by a partner to a
partnersltip results in the receipt by the partner
of m on ey o r other ca n id e ration, inc luding a
promissory obligation fi xed in amount and time
for payment, the transaction will be treated a a
sa l or exchange unde r Code sec tion 707 rather
than a co ntribution under Code section 721.
Treas. Reg. sectio n 1.721 -1(a). By analogy these
criteria sh ould a lso be ap pli ed in d e terminin g
wh e ther the performClnce of se r vices for a
par tne rship co ns titutes a 'sa le or exch an ge' of
s uch services or a con tribution .
In the proposed rulin g A rec ives no conside ration for his se rv ices o ther th a n a sh a re of partnersh ip profit. Although man y fac tors must be
cons id ered in determining whether a particul a r
transact io n co ns titutes a contributi o n, the fact
that a transferor of property o r rende re r of services receives only a right to s h a re in profits
should genera ll y be g iven mo re we ight than the
o th e r factors conide red. 31s
l"GCM 38067 (Aug. 29, 1979), considering Rev. Rul. 81-301,
pp. 17-19; flccnrrl, GCM 36702 (Apr. 12,1976).
JlSGC M 37193 Ou ly 13, 1977). See also Tech . Adv. Mem.
B642003 (June 30, 1986) (" In general, transaction s between
p~r tn e r s and partnerships fa ll into one of three classes of
transactions for federa l income tax purposes. TIlese three
ca tegories are: (1) transactions wi th a partner other than in
his capaci ty as a par tner, (2) g ua ranteed payments to a
p~rtner for the use of capital or for se rvices rendered in hi s
ca pacity as a partner, and (3) all other payments to a partner
in his c, pacity as a partner. Section 707(a) of the Code is
app li ca ble to the first category of transacti ons. Section 707(c)
of the ode is appl icable to the econd category of tra nsaclions. Section 702, 703, 704 a nd 731 of the Code [and common-law Cllibal soll nonrealization admission ) are app li cable
to the third category of transactions .")

I hav e suggested above that a "contributio n" /corporate d ebt equity analysis may be too limited . Among
other things, s uch corporate d e bt-equity ana lysis turn s
more on risk of payment, which in the p a rtnership
context speaks more to entrepreneuria l risk as to payment. 316 While some corporate debt-equity preced ents
turn on whether "essential opera ting assets" are transferred, often this factor seems more of a bac ks top to
debt-equity ratio.317 The better approach would be to
pursu e the thought in some Service rulings on whether
the services are within the scope of the agreement,
usual for the partic ul a r business, and p e rhaps us ual
for that particular partners hip.318 I s uspec t th a t this
a rea will need more rulings before the principles ca n
b e a rticulated .
2. Paymen t s ub ject to entrepreneurial risk. As the
tax s heltered taxpayer' s pre fe rred tax pos ture s hifted
from "guaranteed pay m ents" for s uch management
services to "distributive sh a re," the Service too fIip flop~e d, as reco unted above. In Revenue Ruling 81 300, 19 the Interna l Revenue Service di sagreed with the
Tax Court's conclusion in Pratt that the payments were
not section 707(c) "guaranteed pay ments, " si n ce they
were measured by gross income. The Se rvice reasoned
that on the Pratt facts, the gross income re quire me nt
did not come within the sec tion 707(c) tes t that the
pa y ment be dete r mined without r ega rd to th e
partne rship 'S income. "It is the pos ition of the lnt m al
Revenue Service that in Pratt the m a na gement fe es
were guaranteed payments und er Section 707(c) of the
Code. On the facts presented, th e payments w ere not
disguised distributions of partnership net income, but
were compensation for se rvices p aya bl e with o ut
regard to partnership income."320 At the sa me time, in
Revenue Ruling 81-301,321 th e S rvice buttressed Prall's
section 707(a) analysis by seemingly limiting th e
predecessor to secti on 707(a)(1)'s nonpartner capaci ty
transactions to those where the partner's rvices for
th e partnership in question were sub ta nti ally the same
as servi ces it rendered as an independent contrac to r or
as a n agen t for o thers.n2 Furthermore, the inv es tnlent
adviso r was not personally lia ble for partnership losses
incurred in investments made pursu ant to its se rvices
o r advice, paid its own ex penses in re nde ring advice
(including o ffice expenses and personnel expenses),
a nd could be re moved by a majority vote of the othe r
partners.

at
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also note 2 s upra.
Aquala ne Shores, In c. v. Co mmissiol1 er, 269 F.2d 116, 119-20

l l6S ee
.117

(5th Cir. 1959).
JJ8S ee GeM 37193 supra.
319
1981-2 C. B. 143.
l1Q Rev. Rul. 81-301, supra note 310, a t 1981-2 C.B. 144.
32 1
1981 -2 C.B. 144.
J22Rev. Rul. 81-301, sllpra note 310, at 1981-2 C.B. 144. The
accompanying GCM 38067 (A ug. 29, 1979), reveals that the
Service cou ld point to "no one fact" tha t distinguished Pratt's
general partners who were acting in partner capacity from
the investment adviser who but for its "small interest in
profits and losses, . .. wou ld not be a partner at all but merelya th ird-pa rt y dealing wi th the partnership." ld. at 17-18.
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Co n gr s w is Iy concl u ded in 1984 tha t Revenue
Ruling 81-300 was in s u ffi cie nt to c han n e l p a rtne rs hip
p ay me nt to partn e r fo r se rvices th a t w o uld n o t be
c urr nlly d d uc ti b le, if pa id to th ird pa rti es, in to section 70~(c) las ifi cation a n d, acco rding ly, in the Defic it
Red u ctlOn Act o f 1984, e n ac ted sec ti n 707(a)(2)( A),
w hich auth riz
r gu la tio n (as ye t n o t pro p osed )
tr a ti ~g a transa .tion as a s clio n 707(a)( l ) n o npa rtne r
ca p aCI ty tra n actIo n (and h e nc u bject to the "origin o f- the-c1aim" te t, b u t n o t to th
p ecial accrual rul es
o f se ti o n 707(c» if (1) the re nditi o n o f the se rvices o r
tran fe r of pro p e rty b th p a rme r, a nd (2) a relate d
d ir ec t or indirec t pa rtn r s hip a ll o cation v iewed
tog th r wi th th d i t r ibu ti n a r " p rope rl y " so charac te ri zed .3D o n g r s s ke tch ed i n n ex clu ive facto rs for "? e te rmini~ g w h e th r th partne r is receiving
the puta tl V a 110 , t lo n a nd d i tribu tio n in his capacity
as a par t n e~,"3N T h e fi rs t, and gen · ra lly mos t impo rta n t, fa to r IS w h th r I'h p a rl' n r 's a ll oca tion-cum-distribution is s ubject to signifi < nt e n tre pre n e ur ia l ris k
to th rec ip i n l p a rln e r (s to Ihe a m u n t a nd fact o f
p ay me nt. 3~S T he s o n d fa to r i tra n ito ry partner
s ta tu s, w h l h s ugges ts th a t a p ay m n t cons titute s a fee
in re tu rn fo r prop rt y.326 Sh rt- te rm, g ross incom e alloca ti n w u ld b p ar ticul a rl y u p ecl h e re, due to (1)
the red u c d r i k, (2) th tra n Hory na tu re o f the
rela tion h ip, an d (3) the pro jmity in time to the p erform a n ce of the s r vice (th la tte r two elements also
can tit u te n g li v cri t ria can ide red y Congress).327

I

IStructured discretion ' serves good
public policy when rulemaklng by the
agency is routine/~ if not commonll"
sought by the taxpayer.

In s umm a ry, t d t rmin th prope r characte riza tion of the pay m e n t, a two- tep a n a lysis often is
necessary. T h fi rs t CJu s ti n i whe th e r the e rvices
w re p e rf rm d or prope r ty, tc., wa s tra n sferred in
th e p a rtn r' ca p aci ty as a p a rtn e r. If n o t, sec t io n
707(a )(1 ) w o uld pp ly if th s 'r v ice prov id e r o r properth rwi se a p a rtn e r. On the other
ty tran·f ro r w r
h a nd , ev n if th
s r vic / pr o perty we r e
provided/ t ra n s fer r d i n th e se r v i ce pr ov ider /
tra ns fe ro r ' capaci ty a a partner, the paym e nt ca n ta ke
on a n o n partn r h arac t ri ti c, i. ., ec tio n 707(c) s ta tus
as a g u a r a nt eed payme nt o r sec ti o n 707(a )( 2)( A )
equ iva lent o f a " f ," if the p ayme nt te rm m a n ifes te d
u ffici nt n npartn r ch racteristic a to ce rtai nty o f
pay m nt. A to thi In tt r q u estio n , n e w e ctio n
707(a)(2)(A) ft n, if no t always, s h o uld b e d e te nninative.

12JSection 707(a)(2)(A),
mS. Print. No, 169, slipra note 32, at 226.
J25Jd. at 227.
1l'S. Rep. No. ] 69, supra n te 32, a t 227,
m Id.
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IV. A n A d m ini Irat ive La w P ers pecti v e
Fr o m t he begi nnin g of mode rn tede r a l ta x
s ta tu te , 32 th r ti ia n s, includi n g, in the la te 1950
a nd a r!l 1960, H arva rd Law Prof or Brown and
Su rrey,3 h ave d ba ted the a d van tages of ge neralized
tax ta tut s, i . ., ta nd ard, ver u d e ta ile d or ru l o riented tax ta lut . T he rece nt m ajori ty o f s tu d nts
of taxa ti n f ll o w th e u r rey chool o f a m o re o r less
gen e ra li zed ta s ta tute imp le m e n ted a nd a mp lified,
h o w. v r, .th ro ug h u ndi p utnbly d e ta il ed Treas u ry regul a tIo ns, In la rge p a rt due to the g rea ter Oex ib ility in
a m e ndin g reg u la ti n tha n s ta tutes in light o f d ev lopin g adminis tra tiv an d judic ia l ex p ri e n c und er th
s ta tu te .3J{) P r f
r Da vi ag ree th a t Ih b est p licy
u s ually is " to Ie is la te broad fr a m e work s fo r a d m in i tra ti v p li cy -m a kin g ."JJI De tail e d re g ulations
pro m u lg at d by a n ad mi ni s tra ti v e age n cy, h e re
Tre as u ry a n d th 5 rvi ce, in cr a se th p rinc ip led isc r ti o n o f th a g n y as a d ec is ion m a k e r, a cco rdi n g to
Professor Da v is 's I ndma rk b oo k Oisc reliOl la ry Ju slice
- A Prel i mi nary I nq ll iry a nd s ubsequ e nt adminis tra ti ve
law sch o ia rs hi p 3J2 I b liev s u ch "stru c tured d iscre-

32l1'fhe debat had begun as early as th e 1920s. Compart
Hearings on H . R. 245 b fore the Sen. Comm. on Finan ,
67 th Cong o1 t Sess. 5 (1921) (Sta tement of Dr. Adam) (drafting goal of "a rather si m ple tax law that the average man Ciln
understand "), wil li H aring on H. R. 6715 before Ihe Sen.
Comm. on Fina nce, 68th ong.l t Sess. 7,57 (1924) (Statement
of A. W. Gregg, Sp ial A ' t to Treasury) (" IC]omp lica tions
come pri mari ly from a comp licated policy," incl uding reorganiza ti ons . "In he bill w iJl cover a given case defin itely and
certainly. Und er the e isting law there are hundreds of cases
where n body know th erfe t of the tra nsaction upon the
tax . TIlis law is defin ite enough so that the taxpaye rs will be
able to tell th Hect of a giv n transaction . . . .") Gregory aro e
fro m this very statut and the Boa rd of Tax Appea ls took
Gregg t hi word . The Sec nd Ci rcui t tru mped the boa rd's
s tat utory liter Ii m wi th the business pu rpos s tandard .
Jl~ Brow n , "A n App roach to Subcha pte r C, " 3 Tax Revision
Compendill lll '16] 9, 1619-20 (1 960) (de ta iled tax statu tes lead
to d efi ci n ies and anoma li s a ppearing tha t require ve n
more in tri ca t elaborations of pattern; fundamenta l so urce is
a ttempt to limi na t the nee ssity fo r res ponsib le admini stration): urrey," omp lex ity and the Interna l Revenu e Code:
The Problem of th Managem ent of Tax Detai l," 34 Law &
Con temp. Probs. 673, 69 -702,703-07 (deba te between general ized and p a rt ic ul ar ized tilX s ta tu tes; concl ud es id ea l is
generahz d ta t ute with detai led regulations). Interestingly,
the Ta Reform Act of] 69, whi ch was Surrey 's brainc hild,
see Lee, supra note 7 , at 132 n. 346, rarely took this tack
(section 385 cons titutes a conspicuous e ception).
)30£.g., Complexity alld tire Income Tax, sllpra no te 329, t
348-5 1. But see E. Cohen, "Rema rks," 26 Nan Tax f. 311, 311-12
(1974). For an e cellent, brief discussion of the recent pattern,
including the "worst of all world ... ex tremely detailed
sta tutes ... w ith broad gra nt s of regulatory autho rity ... ,"
see Evans, "The Cond ition of the Tax Legis la tive Proce s," 39
Tax Notes 1581, 1590 (J une 27, ]988).
3J ISee Dav is, supra note 10, at 38.
lJlDa vis, Discrt tionary Jllstic/!, A Preliminary Inquiry, at 103
(LS U Press 1969); set also Ma h aw, Braeall cra tic fll stice,
Man ag ing Soc ial Disabilit y Claim s, a t 103-22 (Yale llniv. Press
1983).
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tion " serves good public policy when ru lemaking by
the agency (as in th e form of IRS private letter rulings)
is routinely, if not comm only, sought by the taxpayer.
Administrative law scholars be lieve that agencies,
through str uctured discretion, e.g., issuing regulations
(rulemaking) setting forth specific factors to be used in
balancing tes ts implementing the d esired standards
and po licies, can implement s tandards effectively
while maintaining th e burea ucra t's disc retion ary
j ud gement in app li ca ti on. They be li eve that s uch
detai led rules channeling agency exercise of discretion
can develop {rom first cons id ering one con crete problem at a time, announcing the hypo th tica l cases a
ruling and refraining from gen eralizin g; then fashioning generalized principles or s tandards from this experience; and finall y formulating regulations to implement the sta nd ard in the form of s tructur e d
discretion. 333
Some commen tators call for legis lat ion o n the
gro unds that current case law has preempted sound
regula tory au thority. 334 A compa rison of Campbell II
wi th Mark IV highlights the p reem ption probl e m .
However, having ac ted in 1984 a nd h aving largely
taken the revenu e o ut of the a rea with the p assive
activity loss rul es in 1986, Con gress is not likely to heed
u ch ca ll s . A la ndm a rk decision deahng with aggregate
a nd distortion of character of inco m e policies might
end the con fu sion; an admini strative remedy is more
likely. Remember the reserved section 707 legislative
regulations section for disg ui sed se rvices: Do we have
to wa it fo r the S rvice to a ttack the proble m piece-byp iece building up to legisla tive regula tions? I have att mpted to show that the Servi ce a lready has had vast
ruling exp ri ence in common law entry in to a partnership a nd fair ruling exp rie nce with the "substitution
fo r ordinary income" if the ro ute of stand ard s is chosen
to reso lve the profit share for servi ces iss u e. Conversely, if a rule-oriented tai nted freestanding intangible
approach is chosen, th en fewe r ruHngs are needed. In
eith r case, th e Service could soon iss u e draft disc uss ion proposal cal ling for comments if it w ishes to
a ddress the iss u e from a s ubchapter K perspective in
legis lati ve section 707 regulations. [f it just wished to
resolve premature sa les of a profit sh a re in year 1 after
close of the tax year/or in yea r 2, then simple ta x
ace unting mod ifica tio ns to R venue Procedure 93-27
are in ord e r.

Appendix: Aggregate vs. Entity
The be t commen ta ry for purposes of the aggregateentity d bate in the co ntex t of a profits share for services are the "Partnership Tax Colloquium" in 47 Tax
Law Review; the semin al LQ/1e, "Sol Diamond, The Ta x
Co u r t Upsets th e S [vice Par tne r, " 46 So. Ca l. L. Rev.
239 (1973) (fi rst in my no tebook on this is ue a nd
w hi ch I apprecia ted a lot more after studying the legisla ti v hi story of the partnership tax provis ions of the
Deficit Red uction Act of ] 984); and others who have

llJDavis, slipra note 10, at 60.
ll<L.A . Bar Report, s upra note 5.
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studied tha t history, particularly Horten s tine & Ford,
"Receipt of a Partnership Inte res t for Services: A Controversy That Will Not Die," 65 Taxes 880 (1987). Friedman, "Partnership Securities," 1 Fla . Tax Rev. No. 9
(1993), electronically reproduced at 93 TNT 226-166
(Nov. 3, 1993), carefully probes aggregate and entity
approaches to partnership "securities" received for
cash and received for serv ices. Cowa n, " Receipt of an
Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: the Diamond Case," 27 Tax L. Rev. 161 (1972), set
th e terms of the debate a mong practitioners for the last
two d ecades. T ha ve war stories abo ut drafting some of
hi s suggestions - Lane appears to hav influ n ced the
commitment of the American Law Institute, Federal
Income Tax Project Subchapter K Proposals xii, 5-7,
523-32 (1984) to the aggrega te approach (which they
call the "conduit approach") and s ur ly the la tte r 's
s ta n da rd of how a partner, my " h ypo th e ti ca l
proprietress," would b e taxed "if h e ca rri ed on a
h ypothetica l separa te business." [d. a t 524. And the All
Partnership Proposals in turn seem to me to have
strongly influenced Professor C unningh a m 's th o ug ht.
For a genera l ch arting of the sea o f aggregate-entity
a uthorities, see Fellows, "Partnership Taxa ti on : Con fusion in Section 702(b)," 32 Tax L.Rev. 67 (1976) . For
m y thou g hts at th tim e, pl eas follow Professor
Fell ows's cites. [d. a t 68 n. 6, 74 nn . 33 and 34, 75 n. 38,
86 n . 63, and 89 n . 78. She also roadmaps Wolfman's
classic " Level for Determining Ch aracter of Partners hip mcome - Entity v. Conduit Principl e in Partne rship Taxation," 19 N.Y.U. Jl1 st. 287 (1961), which is
where J s tarted. Professor Fellows' eye was good - the
level of profit motive in a partne rs hip theme tha t she
followed in Lee, "Section 183," slIpra note 15, w as contemporaneously convincing as well to the IRS Chief
Counsel in La un ching the initial a ttack again t "abusive
tax shelters." GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976). And the IRS
ultimately convinced the courts of the correctness of
m y conclusion tha t profit m o tive should be d etermined
a t the partnership level. Brannen v. Commissioner, 722
F.2d 695, 703-04 (11th Cir. 1984). But by that time,
having left the partnership area in practice, I had forgotten what I had worked out and erroneously thought
"another time they s hould have li tened to me." I now
see the reaso n fo r entity-level computation of profi t
motive is that this motive is an esse ntia l attribute of
"reporting" that is done at the entity level. Al so, for a
recent sketch of a broad range of aggregate-entity
partners hip issues, see Schnee, "The Future of Partnership Taxation," 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 517,523-27 (1993)The thoughts of some in the Service on aggregateentity under the 1954 and hence 1986 code m ay be seen
in GCM 35709 (Mar. 6, 1974), cons id ering Rev. Ru!.
75-113 (Basye evidences that p a rtne rships are considered entities primarily for purpo es of computin g
the income, and hence the tax, w ed by th e partn rs.
Basye teaches that for purposes of calcu lating partnership income, "the partners hjp is regarded as an independently recogniza b le enti.ty apart from its partners.
Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be disregarded .. . 410 U.s . at 448. "In our
opinion, thi s . .. is a tacit assumption tha t in aU other
res pects, with the excep tion of tha t described beLow,
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the partnership is cons idered an aggregate of its
partners. The on exception is, of course, when a
partner is dealing with hi s partnership [i.e., Section
707]. Such tran saction co uld not be given effec t if the
separa te exis tence of the two were not recognized. In
the instant case, however, we are concerned with a
transaction between the partners qua partnership and
an umelated third party rather than a transaction betwe n a partner and his partner hip ." See also GCM
37540 (May 18, 1978) ("Despite the characterization of
a partner hip inter st as a capital asset under section
741, we believe that the exception for section 751 assets
upon the sa le or exchange of an interest in a partners hip, evidences an intent to look beyond the partnership interes t to th und erl yi ng assets when warranted
in a given si tuation. By tT atiog th e stock received in
exchange for a partner's interest in the partnership
attributable to ' ection 751 as ets: to the extent those
assets are not d escribed in section 1231, as not coming
within section 1223(1), a partner, in accord with congressional intention, is put on almost the same footing
as an individua l proprietor in a trans fer of his intere t
in the busine 5."), reconsidering Rev. Rul. 70-239; Priv.
Let. Ru1. 60057490A (May 17, 1960). Cf. IRS as to election out. Priv. Let. RuJ. 92J4011 (Dec. 26, 1991). The
Supreme Court in Unit ed St.utes v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441,
448 n.8 (1973) quoted th Solicitor G neral as to the
aggrega te-en tity conflict "it seems odd that we should
s till be discus ing uch things i.n 1972," and employed
th e ass ignment of in co m e doctrine that other
authorities have equated with the aggregate approach.
For the semi nal placing of the aggregate-entity issue
in the broader context of the spectrum of business entities, see E us tice, "Subchapter 5 Corporations and
Partn ers hip s: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm
(Some Preliminary Proposals)," 39 Tax L. Rev. 345, 34647 (1984); se also id . at 353-55, 381-89 and 433 Appendix B, for analysis of subch apters K and S difference
along the aggregate-entity fault line. As I pointed out
in Lee, "Entity Classification," supra note 79 at 57, 59
n.8 (1988), Professor Eustice's passthrough mod els
were firs t the basis of Tr asury's testimony in 1986 on
pas through entitie and then incorporated in bits and
pieces in S. Rep. No . 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 783-86
(1986) s ttin g forth the leg is lative history of REMICs,
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sec tions 860A-E. In my article, I elaborated on the
passthrough and separate entity model based largely
on the active-passive owner and active-passiv bu iness or investment factors articulated in th e 1986 legislative history to the Passive Activity Loss Limitations.
/d. at 88-95. I also testified on these models to Congr ss
in th 1987 Master Limited Partnership Hearings. Hearings on Mas ter Limited Partn rships befor th Hou e
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Se lec t Revenue
Measures, lOath Cong., 1 t Sess. 340-41, 345, 351 (1987)
("If substantially all of them [the owners] are not involved in the entity's managem nt r perations, no
functional basis for an aggregat approach exis ts;
policy thus calls for an entity approach .. . . IT]he
hallmark of passthrough [treatment] as to uch [investment] entlties is that the income of th e activity be passive. Here [PTP's] we are concerned with active income/passive investor."). Professor Rudnick
accurately describes my aggregate active owner /active
business passthrough bus iness approach as "in a
populist vein." Rudnick, "Who Should Pay th e Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?," 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
965, 1158 n.60 (1989). By an incredible co incidenc ,
Professor Snoe reinvented the wheel here, proposing
exactly the same model ("Under the pr posed mod I,
if members significantly part icipate in the op rah ns
of a business, they should b taxed directly. On the
other hand, taxation of the business as a separa te entity
is appropriate if the members do not mate rially participate in the business as activity either as manager
or laborers . The model distinguishes betwee n o rganizations engaged in active trades or bu inesses
from organizations engaged in passive investmen ts"),
examining the same tax entities, and even jumpciting
Professor Rudnick at precisely the section ("Misu e of
Material Participation Standard") she direct d at my
article and testimony (which she extensively cited), but
he failed to acknowledge my article or testimony (or
indeed the 1987 Master Limited Partnership Hearings
at all) despite their clear relevance and otherwise xemplary resea rch of scholarship and hearings. Snoe,
"Entity Classification under the Internal Revenue
Code: A Proposal to Replace the R embl anc Mode!,"
15 ]. of Corp'n L. 647, 649 (1990).
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